Physical layer security for visible light communication in reflected indoor environments with inter-symbol interference

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Küçük Resim

Tarih

2023

Dergi Başlığı

Dergi ISSN

Cilt Başlığı

Yayıncı

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

Erişim Hakkı

info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess

Özet

Visible light communication (VLC) is a promising technology for next-generation indoor wireless broadband communication systems. Physical layer security (PLS) is one proposed method to ensure data security for VLC in public areas. However, most PLS studies in the literature neglect the reflections in the VLC channel and do not consider inter-symbol interference (ISI). This paper investigates the ISI effects on the secrecy rate in multiple-input single-output VLC systems where the reflections are not neglected for the cases of perfect and imperfect knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel state information. We aim to compensate for the ISI effects by designing zero-forcing (ZF) and artificial noise (AN) beamformers. In addition, we formulate optimization problems to maximize the secrecy rate resulting in non-convex and NP-hard problems. Thus, we utilize the particle swarm optimization algorithm for solutions and also convert non-convex optimization problems into easily solvable linear problems. Furthermore, robust ZF and AN beamformers for the worst-case scenario are considered for the cases of ISI and no ISI. The results reveal that ISI severely degrades the secrecy rate; however, well-designed beamformers can reverse the ISI effects.

Açıklama

Anahtar Kelimeler

Beamforming, Inter-Symbol Interference, Physical Layer Security, Secrecy Rate Maximization, Visible Light Communication

Kaynak

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

WoS Q Değeri

Q1

Scopus Q Değeri

Q1

Cilt

18

Sayı

Künye

Albayrak, C., Çetinkaya, Ş., Türk, K. ve Arslan, H. (2023). Physical layer security for visible light communication in reflected indoor environments with inter-symbol interference. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 18, 2709-2722. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2023.3268883